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ABSTRACT 59 
Many animals exhibit social learning and behavioural traditions, but human 60 
culture exhibits unparalleled complexity and diversity, and is unambiguously 61 
cumulative in character. These similarities and differences have spawned a 62 
debate over whether animal traditions and human culture are reliant on 63 
homologous or analogous psychological processes. Human cumulative culture 64 
combines high-fidelity transmission of cultural knowledge with beneficial 65 
modifications to generate a ‘ratcheting’ in technological complexity, leading to 66 
the development of traits far more complex than one individual could invent 67 
alone. Claims have been made for cumulative culture in several species of 68 
animals, including chimpanzees, orang-utans and New Caledonian crows, but 69 
these remain contentious. Whilst initial work on the topic of cumulative culture 70 
was largely theoretical, employing mathematical methods developed by 71 
population biologists, in recent years researchers from a wide range of 72 
disciplines, including psychology, biology, economics, biological anthropology, 73 
linguistics and archaeology, have turned their attention to the experimental 74 
investigation of cumulative culture. We review this literature, highlighting 75 
advances made in understanding the underlying process of cumulative culture 76 
and emphasizing areas of agreement and disagreement amongst investigators in 77 
separate fields.  78 
 79 
Keywords: cumulative culture; cultural evolution; ratcheting; social learning; 80 
animal traditions.81 
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I. HOW IS CULTURE ‘CUMULATIVE’? 82 
 83 
On 20th July 1969 Neil Armstrong spoke the immortal words, “That’s one small 84 
step for man, one giant leap for mankind”. Landing the Eagle lunar module on the 85 
moon was a huge achievement for humanity, but it was one that resulted from a 86 
series of many small steps. This crowning achievement of human endeavour was 87 
not planned and devised by Armstrong alone, but by a huge team, deploying 88 
ballistics, electronics, materials science and radio communication technologies 89 
reliant on theoretical and experimental research carried out over several 90 
centuries. Whilst the achievement of individual scientists and engineers may be 91 
ground-breaking, technological progress virtually always depends upon the 92 
work that goes before it.  93 
 The focus of this review is cumulative culture, the ability of humans to 94 
ratchet up the complexity of cultural traits over time. The example of the Apollo 95 
mission demonstrates that humans are able to increase the complexity of their 96 
technology and knowledge over many episodes of social transmission, by 97 
building on the developments of their predecessors. This ratcheting up in the 98 
complexity of cultural traits, frequently across multiple generations, has been 99 
proposed to be the hallmark of human culture (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Enquist 100 
& Ghirlanda; Mesoudi, 2011a), but the cognitive and social processes upon which 101 
it relies remain poorly understood. Here a comparative perspective is potentially 102 
informative. While claims have been made that certain animals possess 103 
cumulative culture in rudimentary form, these are disputed and the human 104 
capacity for cumulative culture is clearly unparalleled in the animal kingdom. 105 
The question of what underlies this difference in human and animal cultures was 106 
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featured in Science magazine’s (2005) list of 100 things we don’t know that we 107 
need to, as the answer to this question has far reaching implications for how we 108 
view our place in nature.  109 
In this paper we review the current theoretical and empirical evidence 110 
addressing cumulative culture in both human and non-human animals. In doing 111 
so, we explore how human culture differs from non-human culture, before 112 
turning to the potential social and cognitive processes that may hold the key to 113 
our species’ unique cumulative cultural capability.  114 
 115 
II. CULTURE IN ANIMALS. 116 
 117 
(1) Defining culture. 118 
The term ‘culture’ is used by researchers from a broad range of disciplines, 119 
including biology, psychology, archaeology, social and biological anthropology, 120 
with each discipline drawing on different epistemological and ontological 121 
assumptions. As Sterelny (2009) points out, these different definitions of culture 122 
are not stipulative, they are hypothesis choosing. Thus, through formulating a 123 
definition, researchers have determined their focus, thereby limiting both what 124 
is investigated and how it is investigated. Using different definitions, the focus of 125 
the study of culture can cover over 11,000 species (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981) or 126 
be restricted to humans (Kroeber & Kluckhorn, 1952). The definitions ascribed 127 
to culture can impose constraints on which learning processes are deemed to 128 
underlie culture (e.g. “Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ 129 
phenotypes, which they acquire from other conspecifics by teaching or 130 
imitation”, (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, page 33). Moreover, the definition also 131 
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dictates whether culture is treated as the physical expression of specific 132 
behaviour patterns (van Schaik et al., 2003) or as the ideas and beliefs which lie 133 
behind behaviour patterns (D'Andrade, 2008). 134 
Here, our primary agenda is to compare the cultural capabilities of 135 
humans and other animals, and accordingly we adopt a definition that lends 136 
itself to this objective. Following Laland and Hoppitt (2003), we define culture as 137 
“group typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a community that rely 138 
on socially learned and transmitted information” (p. 151). This established, we 139 
now consider what is known about culture in non-human animals. 140 
 141 
(2) The animal cultures debate. 142 
Alongside the alternative definitions that different researchers apply to culture, 143 
there are also disagreements about the quality of the evidence necessary for a 144 
given species to be deemed ‘cultural’ (Galef, 1992; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; 145 
Laland & Galef, 2009). For instance, Lefebvre and Palameta (1988) summarise 146 
nearly 100 reports of traditional behavioural patterns in animal species, 147 
including mammals, birds and fish, suggesting that animal traditions are 148 
taxonomically widespread. Although these authors did not classify these 149 
phenomena as ‘culture’, to the extent that the observation of a tradition can be 150 
regarded as evidence for social transmission, these species are potentially 151 
candidates for animal culture. However, it is difficult to establish unequivocally 152 
that social transmission underlies natural diffusions and inter-population 153 
behavioural variation, since individual animals might independently have been 154 
shaped by ecological conditions to perform the focal behaviour. For this reason, 155 
some researchers seek additional evidence that natural traditions are socially 156 
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transmitted, for instance, relying on translocation experiments or careful 157 
analyses of the development of the behaviour. In reviewing field experiments, 158 
Reader and Biro (2010) concluded that social learning has been unequivocally 159 
demonstrated in 20 different species in the wild, including in honeybees, birds 160 
and mammals, and across a range of contexts, including foraging, predator 161 
avoidance and habitat choice. Whilst these experiments do not necessarily test 162 
whether the behaviour patterns are group typical, they do establish that the 163 
relevant information is socially transmitted. However, given that many hundreds 164 
of species of animals have been shown to be capable of social learning through 165 
experiments in captivity, this list almost certainly substantially underestimates 166 
the extent of natural animal tradition. 167 
Primatologists Whiten and van Schaik (2007) restrict culture to those 168 
species with traditions in at least two different behavioural domains, specifically 169 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), orangutans (Pongo ssp) and white-faced 170 
capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus). Whiten et al. (1999) gathered data from 171 
seven long-term chimpanzee field sites providing evidence for 39 behaviour 172 
patterns judged to be cultural by field workers, including food-processing 173 
techniques, such as nut-cracking, methods of parasite inspection and social 174 
customs, such as hand-clasp grooming. Likewise, orangutans have been 175 
proposed to show 24 social and foraging traits (van Schaik et al., 2003), while 176 
foraging traditions have been documented in white-faced capuchins (Panger et 177 
al., 2002), as have social games (Perry et al., 2003- detailed in section IV.3.b). 178 
Thus, although Whiten and van Schaik (2007) argue that culture is not unique to 179 
humans, they argue that there is  only evidence of culture in primates.  180 
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These claims have been criticised by other researchers concerned that the 181 
reports of culture in primates are based upon purely observational studies, with 182 
no experimental evidence that the behavioural variation is indeed a result of 183 
socially transmitted information and not some other factor (Galef, 1992; 184 
Tomasello, 1994; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). While such experimental procedures 185 
are available (e.g. manipulations in which individuals are experimentally 186 
transferred between populations, or populations are transferred between sites), 187 
and have been applied to some fish species (Helfman & Schultz, 1984; Warner, 188 
1988), they are not feasible for primates. More recently, less disruptive methods 189 
have been developed for identifying social learning in the field (Laland et al., 190 
2009; Kendal et al., 2010b). 191 
These examples illustrate that even amongst researchers who argue that 192 
animals have culture, there is disagreement on how widespread culture is. As 193 
these arguments are fully expanded elsewhere (e.g. Laland & Galef, 2009), we 194 
turn to the specific focus of this review, that of cumulative culture. 195 
 196 
III. CUMULATIVE CULTURE. 197 
The idea of cumulative culture is integral to the work of cultural evolutionists 198 
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 199 
1985), who have developed mathematical models, based on those used in 200 
evolutionary biology, to examine how cultural innovations are introduced and 201 
spread within a population. Whilst this work was primarily focussed on culture 202 
in humans, other researchers have been interested in a comparative approach to 203 
culture. In 1994 comparative psychologist Michael Tomasello first coined a 204 
metaphor commonly used to illustrate cumulative culture, that of the ‘ratchet’ 205 
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(Tomasello, 1994). Tomasello argued that loss of a cultural trait across 206 
generations is prevented by high-fidelity information transmission conferred by 207 
accurate social learning processes, creating the opportunity for modifications of 208 
the cultural trait to be devised, ratcheting up its complexity or efficiency. Over 209 
time, repeated modifications result in cultural traits that are too complex to have 210 
been invented by a single individual (Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 1994; 211 
Tomasello, 1999). Several researchers have argued that this cultural ‘ratchet’ is a 212 
unique feature of human culture (Heyes, 1993; Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 213 
1994; Boyd & Richerson, 1996). Theoretical analyses provide support for the link 214 
between high-fidelity transmission mechanisms and cumulative culture: 215 
irrespective of the rate of innovation, cumulative culture cannot emerge without 216 
accurate transmission (Lewis & Laland, In Press). Pradham et al (2012) have 217 
suggested that increased sociability, thus an increase in social learning 218 
opportunity, may be sufficient for cumulative culture to occur, although some 219 
researchers argue that high fidelity transmission is not present in non-humans 220 
(Tennie et al., 2009). 221 
Some researchers have discussed the accumulation of a large number of 222 
behavioural traits (e.g. knowledge of different foods) as cumulative culture (van 223 
der Post & Hogeweg, 2008). However this accumulation does not necessarily 224 
involve modifications over time, nor any ratcheting up in complexity or 225 
efficiency. Cumulative culture may occur alongside the accumulation of 226 
knowledge or behaviour patterns, but there is a key difference between the two. 227 
Henceforth, we describe as accumulation, the addition of knowledge or 228 
behaviour patterns to the behavioural repertoire of an individual or population 229 
(akin to ‘step-wise traditions’, as proposed by Tennie et al. (2009)), and restrict 230 
 10 
use of the phrase cumulative culture to the modification, over multiple 231 
transmission episodes, of cultural traits (behavioural patterns transmitted 232 
through social learning) resulting in an increase in the complexity or efficiency of 233 
those traits. 234 
 235 
IV. EVIDENCE FOR CUMULATIVE CULTURE. 236 
 237 
 (1) Human cumulative culture 238 
(a) Historical evidence 239 
Human culture is clearly cumulative, with innovations being built upon the 240 
knowledge of previous generations and ideas from different disciplines and 241 
populations combined to formulate new traditions and technologies. Lehman 242 
(1947) and Basalla (1988) have both documented the invention, refinement and 243 
propagation of novel innovations across various technological and academic 244 
disciplines (see also: Ziman, 2000). Lehman (1947) found that there had been 245 
rapid advancement in the academic fields of chemistry, genetics, geology, 246 
mathematics, medicine and public hygiene, education, entomology, botany, 247 
philosophy, operatic and symphonic music. Using historical sources 248 
documenting the number of books published or the number of ‘outstanding 249 
contributions’ to a field as judged by several recognised historians, Lehman has 250 
demonstrated exponential growth in these fields on an historical timescale 251 
(starting between 10001600 AD through to the 20th century). Although 252 
Lehman’s data may be somewhat subjective, he obtained data from multiple 253 
sources on the definition of an ‘outstanding contribution’ in a particular field. He 254 
illustrates that by building upon previous knowledge, humans have accelerated 255 
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their discovery of knowledge. Indeed he predicted that in the near future this 256 
acceleration would continue and mechanisation would become more important 257 
and widespread, a prediction that, superficially, appears to be true. While 258 
Lehman (1947) does not explicitly examine whether cumulative culture is 259 
occurring, it is reasonable to assume that the contributions reviewed are built on 260 
previous contributions (Enquist et al., 2008). 261 
Basalla (1988) documents how many innovations, often characterised as 262 
invented by ‘geniuses’, are part of a continuum of technological development and 263 
application of old technology to new areas. For example, Whitney’s cotton gin, 264 
which was patented in 1794 and was used to separate short staple cotton from 265 
pods, built upon a long line of Indian charkhi machines that had separated long 266 
staple cotton from pods, and other agricultural and milling machinery that was 267 
available at the time. Similarly, when Guglielmo Marconi received a Nobel Prize 268 
in 1909 for transmitting radio signals across the English Channel and the Atlantic 269 
Ocean he had built upon, and applied, the pioneering research of physicists such 270 
as Hertz and Righi (Basalla, 1988).  271 
Whilst these historical sources illustrate that human culture is 272 
cumulative, with notable inventions building on the ideas of others, they do not 273 
provide experimental evidence of cumulative modifications to cultural traits.  274 
 275 
(b) Human empirical work 276 
Several researchers have investigated cumulative modifications to behavioural 277 
traits using artificial 'generations' in the laboratory. In these diffusion chain 278 
experiments, participants take part in a task in series; thus the first participant 279 
will act as demonstrator to the second participant, who will in turn act as 280 
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demonstrator to the third participant and so forth (see Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008 281 
for a review). 282 
Kirby et al. (2008) set up a diffusion chain experiment in which novel 283 
words (sequences of lower-case letters) were paired with coloured shapes with 284 
an arrow indicating a movement pattern. Individuals were trained with a set of 285 
shape/movement and word pairs. They were then tested, having to write down 286 
the words paired with both previously seen shapes/movements and, unknown 287 
to the participant, unseen shapes/movements. As mistakes in recall of 288 
shape/movement and word pairs were made across 'generations' in the 289 
experiment, the artificial language became less diverse with an accompanying 290 
reduction in transmission errors. Indeed, in some chains transmission errors 291 
were reduced to zero as languages increased not in complexity but in 292 
‘learnability’. Over the course of the experiment, the structure of the ‘language’ 293 
increased, with words for each colour and each movement type increasing in 294 
similarity. This increase in structure, the authors suggest, was the reason why 295 
the language was transmitted with fewer copying errors. They also argue that 296 
the increased structure, representing an increasingly efficient artificial language 297 
by the end of the experiment, represents cumulative improvement in the trait. 298 
Also using a transmission chain design, Flynn (2008) presented children 299 
with puzzle boxes in which a reward was held in place by a series of defences. 300 
Children received an initial demonstration containing both task irrelevant 301 
actions (which had no bearing on gaining the reward) and task relevant actions 302 
(which allowed reward retrieval). The aim was to assess whether children would 303 
copy both the functional and non-functional actions, or whether the irrelevant 304 
actions would be filtered out gradually along the diffusion chain. Flynn found 305 
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that children did parse out task irrelevant actions, often quite early in the 306 
diffusion chains. Thus the technique that the children employed was gradually 307 
modified across the laboratory ‘generations’, creating a more efficient means to 308 
gain the reward. Flynn (2008) argues that this modification of the procedure 309 
represents a cumulative improvement in efficiency and, therefore, a cumulative 310 
cultural process. 311 
Much of the laboratory-based evidence concerning cumulative increases 312 
in the complexity of human (simple) technologies has been provided by Caldwell 313 
and colleagues (Caldwell & Millen, 2008; Caldwell & Millen, 2010b). 314 
Experimental micro-populations were set simple tasks, such as making paper 315 
airplanes or constructing towers with uncooked spaghetti and plasticine. 316 
Participants were told the aim was to build a plane that flew as far as possible or 317 
a tower that was as tall as possible. By using overlapping laboratory generations 318 
in the population, of variously two to four individuals, they were able to expose 319 
naïve individuals to skilled individuals. Using this ‘micro-society’ replacement 320 
design, they found that over 'generations' the performance of the technology (the 321 
mean distance flown by a plane or the mean height of a tower) increased. 322 
Designs within chains were more similar than those between chains, suggesting 323 
the formation of traditions, with individuals learning socially about design 324 
aspects of the technology.  325 
A striking finding was that the level of conservatism of design was higher 326 
when pay-offs were less predictable (Caldwell & Millen, 2010a). In this 327 
experiment there were two measuring protocols; in one condition spaghetti 328 
towers were measured immediately upon completion, whilst in a second 329 
condition the towers were measured five minutes after completion and following 330 
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their transfer to a table upon which was a desk fan. The increase in uncertainty 331 
about whether the tower would remain standing in the breeze from the fan 332 
decreased the amount of modification made to designs over the chain compared 333 
to towers that were measured immediately, raising the possibility that in more 334 
risky situations the ratcheting up of cumulative cultural traits may be hindered.  335 
Caldwell and Millen (2009) applied the transmission chain design to 336 
examine the mechanisms underlying cumulative changes in cultural traits, in this 337 
case making paper airplanes. Participants were assigned to one of several 338 
conditions in which they could gain information through different mechanisms, 339 
by observing others construct planes (imitation), teaching, and seeing the planes 340 
others had made (emulation), or a combination of these mechanisms. They found 341 
that any one of these mechanisms was sufficient to elicit a cumulative 342 
improvement over the laboratory generations. It remains to be seen whether this 343 
pattern is characteristic of multiple tasks, particularly more complex tasks. 344 
Plausibly, high-fidelity information transmission (e.g. as is potentially facilitated 345 
by language, teaching or imitation) might be necessary for the transmission of 346 
more complicated technology. 347 
The empirical study of cumulative cultural changes in humans is 348 
relatively young, but the results so far give an interesting insight into the 349 
process. A moot point is whether these findings will hold up when more 350 
challenging tasks, those less likely to be invented by a single individual, are 351 
deployed. 352 
 353 
(2) Non-human cumulative culture. 354 
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Compared to the empirical investigation of cumulative culture in humans, that in 355 
other animals is both scarce and controversial.  356 
 357 
(a) Evidence from the wild 358 
Based on observations of animals in the wild, some researchers have claimed 359 
that other species show cumulative culture. As these observations must allow a 360 
comparison with the cumulative culture that is observed in humans, we suggest 361 
the following criteria be deployed to guide identification of cumulative culture in 362 
other animals. First, there should be evidence that the behavioural pattern or 363 
trait is socially learned and any variation in the character is not solely due to 364 
genetic or environmental factors (Laland & Janik, 2006). Second, there must be 365 
evidence that the character in question changes over time in a directional, or 366 
progressive manner. This requires evidence that it has been transmitted 367 
between individuals through social learning over repeated episodes. It also 368 
requires evidence that the character has changed in the transmission process to 369 
achieve an enhanced level of complexity. For practical reasons, a useful yardstick 370 
is that the character should be beyond what a single individual could have 371 
invented alone (Tennie et al., 2009) (Table 1). The evidence for cumulative 372 
transmission may come from long-term field studies, archaeological finds or 373 
some other source. However, we emphasize that the occurrence of similar, but 374 
non-identical, behaviour patterns in different populations (whether for the same 375 
purpose or different purposes), does not constitute evidence that one evolved 376 
from the other, and that supplementary evidence (e.g. observational, 377 
archaeological) will be required to demonstrate that variation in the character is 378 
attributable to ratcheting, and that cumulative change occurs within a historical 379 
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lineage. The appearance of similar methods for performing a task in different 380 
populations may reflect the fact that there is a salient, or easily-discoverable, 381 
method of performing that task and not evidence of shared ancestry.  Cultural 382 
evolution is likely to occur over a shorter time scale than genetic evolution, 383 
which may also alter behaviour, but over a longer time period. 384 
Boesch (2003) proposes three chimpanzee behavioural patterns that he 385 
believes show the hallmarks of cumulative modifications. The first is nut-386 
cracking behaviour, displayed by different populations across Africa. In 387 
particular, Western populations use tools, such as hammer stones, to crack nuts, 388 
and Boesch believes this is an elaboration of an ancestral behaviour pattern of 389 
hitting nuts on the substrate to smash them. This behaviour pattern has, 390 
according to Boesch, been further modified with the use of anvil stones and, in 391 
some cases, a second, stabilising stone. However, the latter claim remains 392 
uncorroborated. Moreover, it is unclear whether even the most complex variant 393 
of nut cracking, that including hammer, anvil and stabilising stone, is too 394 
complex for one individual to have invented (Tennie et al., 2009). Archaeological 395 
analyses by Mercader et al (2007) found chimpanzee nut cracking stone 396 
technology could date as far back as 4,300 years ago, suggesting that there has 397 
been little behavioural modification during that time. Thus, evidence from the 398 
archaeological data and contemporary assessment of the behaviour patterns 399 
suggest that, even if modifications have been added to nut cracking, these are not 400 
obviously more complex than one individual could have invented alone. 401 
The second behaviour pattern outlined as cumulative by Boesch (2003) is 402 
ectoparasite manipulation in the three Eastern chimpanzee communities of 403 
Budongo, Mahale and Gombe. At all three sites leaves are used to inspect the 404 
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parasites that have been removed during grooming; at Budongo the parasite is 405 
placed on a leaf when removed. However, at Mahale individuals fold the leaf and 406 
then cut it with their nail. At Gombe there is a variant in which several leaves are 407 
piled on top of one another before the parasite is placed on the top and 408 
inspected. However, these are small modifications and there is no direct 409 
evidence that what has been described as the ‘modified’ behaviour pattern is 410 
derived from the ascribed ‘ancestral’ behaviour pattern. Whilst the two 411 
hypothetically ‘derived’ behaviour patterns could each have evolved from the 412 
hypothesised ‘ancestral’ character, it remains possible that each variant could 413 
have been invented independently. 414 
The third behaviour pattern highlighted by Boesch (2003) is a 415 
modification of the context for an existing behaviour pattern and the possible 416 
addition of a separate technology to it. This is the digging of wells in dry 417 
environments, which, it is argued is translated to contexts in which water 418 
sources are contaminated where the additional use of leaf sponges is observed. 419 
The addition of leaf sponging to well digging may be regarded as an increase of 420 
complexity of one behaviour pattern, and thus representative of cumulative 421 
culture, although it is not clear that the combination of these existing behaviour 422 
patterns is outside of the capacity of a single individual to invent. Also, the 423 
digging of wells in polluted areas is the application of a known behaviour in a 424 
new context (an ‘innovation’, see Reader & Laland 2003), not an increase in 425 
complexity, and represents accumulation (as discussed in section III (Tennie et 426 
al., 2009)).  427 
Another chimpanzee behavioural trait hypothesised to be the result of 428 
modifications to an ancestral trait is the tool set observed in some populations. 429 
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The complex tool sets observed at some sites, most notably in the central African 430 
communities, appear to be used, in sequence, for different aspects of the same 431 
foraging behaviour (Sanz & Morgan, 2007; Boesch et al., 2009; Sanz & Morgan, 432 
2009; Sanz et al., 2009). One tool is normally used to puncture the outside of a 433 
nest of ants or bees. Other tools are then used to widen the hole to allow greater 434 
access to the food within. Finally, a smaller stick tool is used to gather honey, 435 
ants or larvae. In one study this ‘collector’ stick was modified to increase the 436 
surface area (Boesch et al., 2009; Sanz et al., 2009), the bark being removed and 437 
the wood below chewed to make it more brush-like. These tool sets contrast with 438 
other populations in which similar behaviour is performed, but with a single tool 439 
(Whiten et al., 1999; Humle & Matsuzawa, 2002). Once again, there is no direct 440 
evidence that any of the single tool or proposed ‘simpler’ behaviour patterns are 441 
ancestral to the multiple tool or more elaborate variants. Whilst these tool kits 442 
may be a case of simple cumulative culture, without the required evidence it is 443 
currently not clear that they are more complex than a single individual could 444 
invent alone.  445 
Perry et al. (2003) reported a number of social conventions that arose in a 446 
population of capuchin monkeys that are also suggestive of cumulative culture. 447 
These social games appear to have derived from the existing hand-sniffing 448 
behaviour (Perry et al., 2003), which has been observed in some populations. 449 
The social games, the hand-in-mouth, hair-in-mouth and toy-in-mouth games 450 
emerged in succession, within one group, with the latter two appearing to be 451 
modifications of the first (Perry et al., 2003). However, whilst this represents an 452 
interesting case of modifications to a social behaviour pattern, all modifications 453 
appear to have been initiated by one individual, Guapo, a young male in the 454 
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group. Although this demonstrates the ability of individuals in the species to 455 
make small modifications to a behaviour pattern, it does not represent a multi-456 
generational or even multi-individual behavioural modification. Thus, in the 457 
absence of evidence for repeated bouts of transmission and refinement, this 458 
example too fails to provide clear evidence for cumulative culture, and is better 459 
characterized as several bouts of individual learning building upon one another.  460 
More recently, white faced capuchins have been observed performing the 461 
‘eye poke’ social convention, documented as the poking of a conspecifics finger 462 
into the eye of another (Perry, 2011).  ‘Eye poking’ (to oneself) has interestingly 463 
been reported to occasionally occur concurrent with the ‘hand sniff’ (Perry, 464 
2008), representing conjunction of the two conventions. Importantly however, 465 
this eye poke convention, along with the other reported social conventions, seem 466 
to have been reinvented in different groups/locations (Perry, 2011), providing 467 
further support that these behaviours are not beyond what individuals can 468 
invent for themselves. Moreover, there is as of yet no evidence that eye-poking 469 
with hand sniff is in any sense superior to the hand sniff alone, which means this 470 
variation may well be better characterised as cultural drift (in which random 471 
changes have occurred, without selection). Hence, these examples, while 472 
representing interesting social traditions, cannot yet be said to be cumulative. 473 
Stone-handling behaviour in Japanese macaques is present in different forms at 474 
sites throughout Japan, although its adaptive significance is unknown (Leca et al., 475 
2007; Huffman et al., 2008; Nahallage & Huffman, 2008; Leca et al., 2010). Some 476 
variants of the behaviour are almost ubiquitous, while others are rare, leading to 477 
the hypothesis that some individuals may be specialists, who have created new 478 
behavioural variants from existing ones (Leca et al., 2007). However, once again, 479 
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there is no evidence that even the most complex of the stone-handling 480 
behaviours is outside a single individual’s capacity to invent, and the putative 481 
refinements are not unambiguously improvements. If these traits are non-482 
adaptive, as it is claimed (Leca et al., 2007), then there would seem to be little 483 
reason for there to be conservatism in the behaviour and, therefore, we might 484 
expect to see great diversity in stone-handling modifications in Japanese 485 
macaques through a drift-like process (Caldwell & Millen, 2010a). This would 486 
mean that, rather than any one stone-handling behaviour building in complexity 487 
(or efficiency) upon another, each behaviour may simply represent the 488 
corruption of an existing stone-handling behaviour, inaccurately transmitted 489 
between individuals, without any further addition of complexity.  Note that, we 490 
do not dismiss accidental mutations or inaccurate transmission as playing a role 491 
in cumulative culture but, that for ratcheting to occur beneficial ‘accidents’ would 492 
be preferentially retained. 493 
Circumstantial evidence for cumulative modifications can also be found in 494 
New Caledonian crows (Hunt & Gray, 2004; Seed et al., 2007). The species uses 495 
several tools, the most studied of which are constructed from Pandanus leaves, 496 
which are used for foraging. Hunt and Gray (2003) document three different 497 
designs of these tools: narrow, wide and stepped. Amongst the stepped designs, 498 
between one and four steps are used. These patterns vary geographically across 499 
New Caledonia. It has been claimed that the variation in Pandanus tool design 500 
across New Caledonia is most parsimoniously explained as cumulative variation 501 
(Hunt & Gray, 2003). Hunt and Gray (2003) propose that the wide tools are the 502 
ancestral tools with the narrow and stepped types derived from them. The 503 
variation in stepped tools has also been proposed to be a series of modifications 504 
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to the original one step design (Hunt & Gray, 2003). However, like chimpanzee’s 505 
tools, there is no direct evidence that these lineages are correct and the different 506 
tool types are not individual innovations, each invented from scratch. The 507 
evidence for social learning in the wild is also equivocal, suggesting there is a 508 
significant level of individual invention (Holzhaider et al., 2010) and evidence 509 
from captivity indicates New Caledonian crows may possess an inherited 510 
predisposition for tool use and tool manipulation (Kenward et al., 2005; 511 
Kenward et al., 2006). 512 
The difficulties of interpreting putative examples of cumulative culture in 513 
wild populations, as summarised in Table 1, being at the same time suggestive 514 
but inconclusive, has led some researchers to work on captive populations, to 515 
examine experimentally whether animals are capable of cumulative cultural 516 
learning. 517 
 518 
Insert Table 1 about here 519 
 520 
(b) Empirical testing of non-human cumulative culture. 521 
The first explicit test of the capacity for cumulative cultural learning in non-522 
human primates found little evidence that chimpanzees could accumulate 523 
modifications to their behaviour (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). This test 524 
involved a puzzle box that could be opened in two ways, with the second, more 525 
complicated, method allowing access to nuts and a greater volume of honey than 526 
the first, simpler method, which just allowed animals to dip for honey. The 527 
chimpanzee subjects were allowed to manipulate the puzzle box in a baseline 528 
condition with no demonstration, resulting in two individuals out of 14 529 
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discovering the first, ‘dipping’ method, and one also discovering the more 530 
complicated method. When the dipping method was demonstrated by a familiar 531 
human demonstrator three more individuals managed to learn it. These animals 532 
then received a demonstration of the more complicated method; of the five 533 
individuals tested only one performed the more complicated method and this 534 
was the individual who had already discovered the method in the baseline trials.  535 
Researchers have also drawn conclusions about cumulative culture from 536 
the results of experiments investigating other cognitive factors in chimpanzees. 537 
In an experiment in which subjects were required to obtain food by pushing it 538 
around a maze using a stick, five individuals discovered that by rattling the board 539 
on which the maze was placed, food could be obtained more rapidly (Hrubesch 540 
et al., 2009). The researchers altered the conditions in which animals could 541 
interact with the maze board, either taking away sticks to encourage the rattling 542 
technique, or bolting the maze down to prevent the rattling technique. They 543 
found that individuals did not switch the technique they used and appeared to 544 
have become fixed upon the method they had already discovered. The authors 545 
argue that this behavioural conservatism may explain the lack of cumulative 546 
cultural evolution in non-humans.  547 
Compound tool use, the combining of separate objects to make a meta-548 
tool, has been observed in wild chimpanzees, on a handful of occasions and only 549 
in certain contexts (Sugiyama, 1997; Boesch, 2003). Price et al. (2009) tested 550 
captive chimpanzees, where subjects were required to put together two 551 
component tools to create an elongated single tool that could be used to retrieve 552 
an out-of-reach food reward. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to learn 553 
to combine and use the tool when they had seen a video demonstration showing 554 
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the tool being manufactured and used, than in other conditions, where 555 
individuals received a video demonstration of only part of the process. This 556 
suggests that the participants were able to modify a tool, which they then used to 557 
retrieve food and may have the potential for rudimentary cumulative cultural 558 
learning. However, as some control subjects, who received no demonstration of 559 
the combining process, were also able to learn to make the complex tool, it 560 
clearly is not beyond a single individual’s capabilities (Tennie et al., 2009). 561 
The most comprehensive experimental attempt to investigate the factors 562 
that may underlie cumulative culture in animals to-date was carried out by Dean 563 
et al (2012). In a comparative study of sequential problem solving, Dean et al 564 
provided groups of capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and nursery school 565 
children with an experimental puzzle box that could be solved in three stages to 566 
retrieve rewards of increasing desirability (Figure 1). Stage 1 required 567 
individuals to push a door in the horizontal plane to reveal a chute through 568 
which a low-grade reward was delivered. Stage 2 required individuals to depress 569 
a button and slide the door further to reveal a second chute for a medium grade 570 
reward. Stage 3 required the solver to rotate a dial, releasing the door to slide 571 
still further to reveal a third chute containing a high-grade reward. All stages 572 
could be completed through two parallel options, with sets of three chutes on 573 
both left and right sides. This two-action, two-option design aided evaluation of 574 
alternative social learning mechanisms and allowed two individuals to operate 575 
the puzzle box simultaneously. After 30 hours of presentation of the task to each 576 
of four chimpanzee groups, only 1 of 33 individuals reached stage 3, with a 577 
further 4 having reached stage 2, and with each group having witnessed multiple 578 
solvers at stage 1 (experiment 1). Chimpanzee performance was not greatly 579 
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enhanced by trained demonstrators (experiment 2). A similar pattern was 580 
observed in the capuchins: after 53 hours, no individual reached stage 3 and only 581 
two individuals reached stage 2. Thus, the experiments provided no evidence for 582 
cumulative learning in chimpanzees or capuchins. These findings stand in stark 583 
contrast to those of the children, where despite a far shorter exposure to the 584 
apparatus (2.5 hours), five out of eight groups had at least two individuals (out of 585 
a maximum of five) who reached stage 3, with multiple solvers at stages 2 or 3 in 586 
all but two groups. Dean et al found that the success of the children, but not of 587 
the chimpanzees or capuchins, in reaching higher-level solutions was strongly 588 
associated with a package of sociocognitive processes—including teaching 589 
through verbal instruction, imitation, and prosociality—that were observed only 590 
in the children. Children’s individual task performance covaried strongly with 591 
the amount of teaching, imitation and other prosocial behaviours (donation of 592 
retrieved stickers) they personally received; those children that received less 593 
support were less likely to get to the higher cumulative stages of the task and all 594 
children who got to the final stage did so with, usually, at least two forms of 595 
social support (Dean et al., 2012). Thus, completion of all stages of the task was 596 
beyond that which an individual child could invent for his/herself. While this 597 
study does not represent a multi-generational approach, it provides evidence for 598 
the socio-cognitive factors necessary for cumulative learning to occur, and 599 
provides evidence of repeated bouts of elaboration and social transmission 600 
amongst the children. 601 
 602 
Insert Figure 1 about here 603 
 604 
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In summary, at present, reports of cumulative culture in animal species 605 
remain subjective and circumstantial. Observations from the wild and captivity 606 
suggest that while some species are capable of modifying behaviour, these 607 
modifications do not seem to accrue across generations and do not clearly move 608 
beyond what individuals alone can invent for themselves (see also: Tennie et al., 609 
2009). This suggests that while animals can transmit behaviour socially to create 610 
localized traditions, animal cultures are either not cumulative at all or 611 
cumulative in a highly restricted and simple respect.  612 
 613 
V. WHY ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN CUMULATIVE CULTURE BETWEEN 614 
HUMANS AND NON-HUMANS? 615 
The evidence that cumulative cultural evolution may be unique to humanity has 616 
led researchers to construct various hypotheses as to the critical processes that 617 
underpin human cumulative culture.  618 
 619 
(1) Hypotheses concerning the lack of cumulative culture in non-humans. 620 
Some of the hypotheses focus upon species differences in social structure and 621 
inter-individual tolerance that might plausibly affect the spread of cumulative 622 
innovations. Others focus on cognitive mechanisms that may affect the 623 
constituent processes of cumulative culture.  624 
 625 
(a) Cognitive differences 626 
The distribution of cumulative culture may be accounted for by the presence of 627 
cognitive mechanisms specific to, or substantially enhanced in, humans. 628 
 26 
However, researchers do not agree which particular processes are unique to 629 
humans and which may promote cumulative culture. 630 
 631 
(i) Innovation: An increased creativity, that is the ability to innovate, has been 632 
proposed to drive cumulative culture. Enquist et al. (2008) argue that cultural 633 
traits must be invented to spread within the population and be modified in a 634 
cumulative process. Whilst this argument is logical, there are extensive data 635 
documenting innovations in a range of species of primates (Reader & Laland, 636 
2002) and birds (Overington et al., 2009), yet comparatively little evidence for 637 
traditions and cumulative culture. This data suggests that innovation alone is not 638 
sufficient for cumulative culture. Indeed, a recent study suggests that innovation 639 
may act as a cultural catalyst, at least in the early stages of ratcheted 640 
technologies, functioning only to speed up the level of cultural complexity 641 
attained (Pradhan et al., 2012).   642 
  643 
(ii) Conservatism: In contrast to the creativity of humans, it has been argued that 644 
non-humans are conservative in their actions. Some experimental studies have 645 
reported that non-humans, in particular chimpanzees, continue to use the first 646 
solution they discover even when a potentially more rewarding alternative is 647 
available to them (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Hrubesch et al., 2009; 648 
Whiten et al., 2009). A recent demonstration of conservative behaviour in 649 
chimpanzees was provided by Hopper, et al. (2011). In this study, chimpanzees 650 
preferentially exchanged the token they had seen a conspecific model exchange 651 
for food, even when the food received was of lower value than that which a 652 
second, alternative, token yielded. Interestingly, the two potential outcomes 653 
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(high or medium value rewards associated with the two token types) were 654 
gained using the same behaviour (token exchange), yet there was little evidence 655 
of chimpanzees switching between the tokens despite all gaining experience with 656 
the alternative token, which in one group yielded the high value rewards. 657 
However, the extent to which the two behavioural options were understood by 658 
the chimpanzees is unclear. Likewise, the role of the identity of the model in 659 
enhancing this conservatism is yet to be investigated, and may prove explanatory 660 
given that both models were of relatively high rank (Kendal et al. in prep) 661 
Researchers have argued that the discovery or utilisation of a more 662 
rewarding solution is suppressed by the initial discovery of a task solution 663 
(Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Hrubesch et al., 2009; Whiten et al., 2009; 664 
Hopper et al., 2011). Similar arguments concern a species propensity for 665 
functional fixedness, that is the inability to use items beyond their initially learnt 666 
affordances (Hanus et al., 2011). Specifically, it is thought that functional 667 
fixedness can occur from one’s own experience with environmental features, 668 
canalising its use according to how such was personally used in the past. 669 
Alternatively, normative influence may play a role, such that one’s cultural 670 
background or norms for item affordances could inhibit learning new item 671 
functions (Gruber et al., 2011; Hanus et al., 2011).  According to these arguments, 672 
cumulative additions to a solution would be increasingly likely to occur in 673 
species as conservatism (and/or functional fixedness) decreased. Wood et al. 674 
(2013) have recently shown that children acquire multiple strategies to a 675 
problem, even where their first solution procured a reward of no lesser value 676 
than the alternative solutions they went on to use. Therefore, if humans are less 677 
conservative than chimpanzees, as suggested by Whiten et al. (2009), this may 678 
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partly explain the prevalence of cumulative culture in the former relative to the 679 
latter. However, the aforementioned study of cumulative problem solving, in 680 
children, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys (Dean et al., 2012), found no 681 
evidence for conservatism or behavioural inflexibility in any of the species. 682 
It is important, here, to distinguish between conservatism as a mechanism 683 
and as an outcome. For example, if a species lacks the capability to copy in 684 
proportion to behavioural payoffs, beneficial demonstrated solutions may be 685 
neglected in favour of previously learned and rewarded solutions. Thus animals 686 
would fail to elaborate upon acquired behaviour and would consequently appear 687 
‘conservative’. Conservatism, as a mechanism,  however, posits that there exists a 688 
specific conservative learning strategy on the part of the animal. 689 
Interestingly, behavioural flexibility rather than conservatism has 690 
recently been documented in captive orangutans. Lehner et al. (2011) 691 
investigated orangutans’ (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) ability to modify previously 692 
used techniques when the previous behaviours were blocked. Three conditions 693 
were presented in which orangutans could retrieve syrup from a tube employing 694 
various tool methods, the two later conditions were successively more 695 
restrictive, forcing animals to alter the method they had used previously. The 696 
animals did switch to new techniques for gaining the food reward, 697 
demonstrating behavioural flexibility. The authors claim that two of the 698 
techniques built cumulatively upon other techniques, however there is no 699 
evidence that these new techniques were socially transmitted.  700 
 701 
(iii) Imitation: The fidelity of transmission of behavioural traits between 702 
individuals has been proposed to be of key importance to the evolution of 703 
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cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Galef, 1992; Tomasello, 1994; 704 
Lewis & Laland, In Press). Imitation, learning the exact motor pattern of a 705 
behaviour from observing another individual, is argued by some researchers as 706 
central to human cumulative culture (Tomasello, 1994; Boyd & Richerson, 1996; 707 
Tomasello, 1999), since it is the social learning process capable of supporting 708 
high-fidelity transmission. Thus individuals do not have to ‘reinvent the wheel’ 709 
when they learn a new behaviour. 710 
Recent theoretical work suggests that imitation is not necessary for non-711 
cumulative traditions, which can emerge from simple learning processes, such as 712 
local/stimulus enhancement coupled with reinforcement learning or from 713 
asocial learning when individuals are exposed to the same environment (van der 714 
Post & Hogeweg, 2008). These learning mechanisms, while sufficient to support 715 
durable traditions (Matthews et al., 2010) or an accumulation of behavioural 716 
traits (van der Post & Hogeweg, 2008), would seem an insufficient foundation for 717 
cumulative culture insofar as enabling the accumulation of beneficial 718 
modifications to an existing behavioural trait, increasing its complexity. To the 719 
extent that local/stimulus enhancement results in low fidelity transmission, as is 720 
widely thought (although we note there is little hard data here), then Lewis and 721 
Laland’s (In Press) theoretical analysis would not expect it to result in 722 
cumulative culture. Thus, if a species is not capable of accurate imitation (or 723 
teaching) it is much less likely that it will be able to develop cumulative culture. 724 
In support of this theory, Dean et al. (2012) found that between species 725 
(capuchins, chimpanzees and children), and within species, performance with a 726 
cumulative problem-solving task correlated strongly with the degree of task 727 
manipulations performed by individuals that matched those of their 728 
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predecessors at the task. It is noteworthy, however, that end state emulation can 729 
result in high-fidelity social learning and thus imitation may not be as essential 730 
for cumulative culture but rather high fidelity learning in general (Caldwell et al., 731 
2012). However, end state emulation may result in high fidelity learning only in 732 
those tasks for which the end product can readily be recreated from viewing the 733 
action’s products, while imitation is required for process-opaque tasks (Acerbi et 734 
al., 2011; Derex et al., 2012). Object movement emulation may constitute another 735 
route to high fidelity learning. For example, it has been shown that after viewing 736 
video footage of physical object movements only, through digital removal of a 737 
demonstrator’s behaviour, children’s object movements were comparable to 738 
when a full behavioural-object movement demonstration was viewed (Huang & 739 
Charman, 2005). Task difficulty and task demands are however likely to play an 740 
important role in whether forms of emulation are sufficient to optimise 741 
behaviour (Acerbi et al., 2011).  742 
Why, then, when there is recent evidence that chimpanzees are capable of 743 
imitation (Whiten et al., 1996; Horner et al., 2006; although see Tennie et al., 744 
2012), do they not appear to have developed cumulative culture? There are 745 
various potential explanations for this. First, while chimpanzees have shown 746 
some capacity for imitation this may be the exception rather than the rule, with 747 
other social learning mechanisms such as emulation or stimulus enhancement, 748 
associated with lower copying fidelity, responsible for much behavioural 749 
propagation (Tomasello, 1999; Tennie et al., 2009; Hopper, 2010; although see 750 
Caldwell et al., 2012). Moreover, comparative studies reveal substantive 751 
differences in the amount of imitation, and rate of imitative learning, exhibited 752 
by humans and chimpanzees (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Herrmann et al., 2007; 753 
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Dean et al., 2012; Hecht et al., 2012), suggesting that while chimpanzees may be 754 
capable of imitation, they are not as proficient at it (or perhaps, as motivated to 755 
imitate) as humans. Second, there is a lack of evidence that when imitating 756 
chimpanzees formulate the copied agent’s intentions (Tomasello & Carpenter, 757 
2007). That is, compared to humans, chimpanzees may be less capable of 758 
rational imitation, or may be less able to imitate actions deliberately and 759 
consciously in order to achieve the same outcome as that inferred for the 760 
demonstrator. The ability to take into consideration the demonstrator's goals 761 
and intentions might plausibly facilitate cumulative culture, if this increased the 762 
accuracy of information transmission (although see arguments regarding 763 
imitation of irrelevant actions, or ‘overimitation’ in children (Horner & Whiten, 764 
2005; Lyons et al., 2007; Lyons et al., 2011).  765 
 766 
(iv) Adaptive filtering: Enquist and Ghirlanda (2007) argue that imitation alone 767 
cannot support cumulative culture. They argue that in the absence of adaptive 768 
filtering mechanisms, or strategies evaluating the consequences of observed 769 
behaviour, blind or random imitation is likely to occur. This creates a situation in 770 
which maladaptive traits are as likely to spread as adaptive traits. However, if 771 
individuals use rational imitation (Carpenter et al., 1998; Gergely et al., 2002) or 772 
reliable learning heuristics (Laland, 2004) dictating what (and whom, e.g. (Wood 773 
et al., 2012) is copied, the replication of maladaptive or suboptimal traits could 774 
be reduced. In the case of chimpanzees, the absence of cumulative cultural 775 
evolution, may also be related to an inability to evaluate the consequences, or 776 
payoffs, of observed behaviour. It has yet to be established whether 777 
chimpanzees, and indeed other animals, possess an adaptive-filtering process 778 
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that serves to remove maladaptive behaviour, but there are reasons for doubting 779 
that this is the key to the absence of cumulative culture in animals. That is 780 
because the demonstrating animals themselves are likely to exhibit adaptive 781 
filtering, since individuals disproportionately perform productive, high-payoff 782 
behaviour, leaving the pool of variants available to copy a selective set of tried-783 
and-tested solutions (Rendell et al., 2010).  784 
 785 
(v) Teaching: Teaching is behaviour that functions to impart knowledge, and 786 
differs from other forms of social learning in requiring an active and costly 787 
investment by the tutor into the learning of the pupil (Caro & Hauser, 1992). 788 
Teaching frequently requires the teacher to infer the current knowledge state of 789 
the pupil to allow an appropriate level of support (Flynn, 2010); however, 790 
inferring knowledge states in other animals is difficult. The distribution of 791 
teaching may be wider than previously thought, with experimental evidence in 792 
meerkats, pied babblers, ants and bees (Franks & Richardson, 2006; Thornton & 793 
McAuliffe, 2006; Raihani & Ridley, 2008), although whether the teaching in non-794 
humans is consanguineous to human teaching remains debatable (Premack, 795 
2007; Hoppitt et al., 2008). Teaching may be particularly important for the 796 
transfer of cumulative modifications, as it functions to promote the fidelity of 797 
knowledge transfer, potentially allowing specific behavioural patterns to be 798 
transmitted between individuals until such a time as beneficial modifications 799 
appear (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Tomasello, 1999). Indeed, teaching can be 800 
characterized as behaviour that functions specifically to enhance the fidelity of 801 
information transmission. A recent mathematical analysis of the evolution of 802 
teaching (Fogarty et al., 2011) found that cumulative culture broadens the range 803 
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of conditions under which teaching is favoured by selection, leading to the 804 
hypothesis that teaching and cumulative culture may have coevolved. This 805 
finding is consistent with the findings of the aforementioned experimental 806 
investigation of cumulative culture (Dean et al., 2012), which reported strong 807 
positive correlations between how much teaching a child received from other 808 
children and how well they performed on the cumulative culture puzzle box task.  809 
 810 
(vi) Complex communication: Alongside teaching, human language, a uniquely 811 
complex communication system (Tomasello, 1999; Hauser et al., 2002; Pinker & 812 
Jackendoff, 2005; Cheney & Seyfarth, 2010), may promote cumulative culture, 813 
again through facilitating accurate transmission. Language allows the 814 
transmission of intentions and complex behaviour patterns between individuals 815 
and the facilitation of easy and ‘cheap’ pedagogy; greatly enhancing teaching. 816 
Language has also enabled humans to compile written records of the beliefs, 817 
ideas, innovations and technologies of our predecessors, which provides 818 
protection against cultural loss, as well as enabling access to the knowledge of 819 
individuals that are outside individuals’ social networks. Language, both in the 820 
form of verbal and linguistic notation therefore, could enable high-fidelity 821 
transmission of modifications to existing behavioural traits, facilitating 822 
cumulative culture (Tomasello, 1999; Csibra & Gergely, 2005; Tomasello et al., 823 
2005; Carpenter, 2006). Consistent with this, Dean et al. (2012) found that 824 
children’s performance in the cumulative task covaried with the amount of 825 
verbal instruction they received from other children.  826 
 827 
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(vii) Prosociality: The evolution of prosociality, enabling cooperation between 828 
individuals, increased tolerance, and the shared motivations of individuals has 829 
been proposed to support the evolution of cumulative culture (Tomasello & Call, 830 
1997; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello & Moll, 2010). The 831 
argument states that if individuals cooperate they will be able to work on a task 832 
together, allowing naïve individuals to get closer to and thus learn from a 833 
knowledgeable individual (Tomasello & Call, 1997). Working together also 834 
allows two or more individuals to discover solutions to a task and to pool their 835 
information, thus providing the opportunity for two separate solutions to be 836 
combined or modified (Tomasello, 1999). If individuals share motivations they 837 
are able to recognise that another individual has a goal and intentions, and 838 
potentially are able to assist others to achieve their goal (Tomasello et al., 2005). 839 
Shared intentionality, in which individuals recognise that others, who may not 840 
even be present at the time, share their goals and intentions, can facilitate the 841 
modification of a behaviour pattern by many individuals, over many 842 
transmission episodes and, therefore, the evolution of cumulative culture 843 
(Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello & Moll, 2010). Indeed, Dean et al. (2012) also 844 
highlighted a significant role for prosocial behaviour (donation of retrieved 845 
rewards to others) in the success of children in their cumulative problem-solving 846 
task. These authors hypothesized that such prosocial behaviour signified an 847 
understanding of shared motivations and served to scaffold the learning of naïve 848 
individuals. 849 
In summary, a number of cognitive differences have been proposed to 850 
explain the evolution of cumulative culture. However, it seems unlikely that one 851 
cognitive trait could explain the evolution of cumulative culture by itself. Instead 852 
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there may be differences in a suite of cognitive traits between species (e.g. socio-853 
cognition: teaching, imitation, pro-social behaviour and complex communication, 854 
(Tomasello, 1999; Dean et al., 2012)), which collectively afford the high-fidelity 855 
information transmission, social tendencies, and motivations necessary for 856 
cumulative culture. 857 
 858 
(b) Social learning strategies 859 
Whilst social learning may often provide a cheaper and quicker method of 860 
learning than asocial learning (Rendell et al., 2010), theoretical models suggest 861 
that it should not be used indiscriminately (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland, 862 
2004). Rather, to enhance fitness individuals should use social learning 863 
strategies, or cultural transmission biases, to dictate when to collect social 864 
information and from whom to acquire it (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland, 865 
2004; Kendal et al., 2005; 2009b). Certain social learning strategies have been 866 
proposed to be important to the evolution of cumulative culture. 867 
 868 
(i) Conformity: One such strategy is conformity, defined as the propensity to 869 
disproportionately copy the most frequent behavioural trait in the population, 870 
over and above the chance expectation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & 871 
Boyd, 1998; Whiten et al., 2005). Our definition of conformity differs from that 872 
deployed in social psychology, which focuses on the normative and social 873 
influence acting on the copying of (incorrect) decisions, originating from the 874 
work of Asch (1955),  (Morgan & Laland, 2012). Mathematical models reveal that 875 
conformity is favoured under a very wide range of conditions (Henrich & Boyd, 876 
1998) and contributes to the high-fidelity transmission required for cumulative 877 
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culture. However, Eriksson et al. (2007) found that conformity hindered the 878 
spread of adaptive variants, with individuals who adopt cultural traits at random 879 
being more successful than those who adopt a conformist strategy. Eriksson et 880 
al.’s model encompasses temporal variation in the environment but not a spatial 881 
component, thus preventing sub-populations from forming and, therefore, 882 
conformity from evolving within them. Thus the model fails to provide a realistic 883 
approximation of human demography and the geographical parameters that 884 
influence behaviour and trait transmission.  885 
Conformity, defined as copying the behaviour displayed by the majority of 886 
individuals rather than disproportionate copying of the behaviour of the 887 
majority, was recently shown in chimpanzees and 2-year-old children (Haun et 888 
al., 2012). Specifically, after observing three conspecifics demonstrate the same 889 
behaviour (each dropping a ball into a coloured box) or one individual 890 
demonstrate a different behaviour three times (drop a ball three times into a 891 
different coloured box), chimpanzees and children copied the behaviour of the 892 
majority. In contrast, orangutans showed no such majority biased copying when 893 
exposed to the same experimental procedure. While this study makes an initial 894 
step towards investigating general majority biased transmission in different 895 
primate species’, the interpretation of this data is open to debate (pers. comm. 896 
Tom Morgan). As noted by Haun and colleagues (2012), further investigation in 897 
this area is needed, particularly to isolate the influence of unbiased or random 898 
copying in such tasks, as unbiased copying itself is frequency dependent. The 899 
testing of conformity bias, defined as a disproportionate likelihood of copying 900 
the most frequent trait in a population, is required before drawing conclusions 901 
on the effect conformity has on other animals’ social transmission and their 902 
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opportunities for cumulative culture. Furthermore, avoidance of the minority 903 
response or the undemonstrated option could have played a role in the 904 
behavioural responses observed in chimpanzees and children (pers. comm. Tom 905 
Morgan). Further data will help clarify majority biased learning in these species.  906 
 Kandler and Laland (2009) modelled the spread of cultural traits, derived 907 
through independent innovation or cumulative modification, with different 908 
levels of conformity bias (defined as disproportionately copying the most 909 
common cultural variant) to the transmission of the traits. They found that 910 
strong conformity (in which it was difficult for frequency-independent traits to 911 
invade) tended to hinder the spread of novel innovations within the population, 912 
irrespective of whether the innovation was beneficial or not, as individuals 913 
would fail to switch to a new variant. Conversely, under a weaker conformity 914 
bias a beneficial variant could spread within the population. Some individuals 915 
would switch after determining that the new variant was more beneficial, and 916 
this was enhanced as the trait became more common by individuals using a 917 
conformist learning bias. Weak conformity was, therefore, suggested to be 918 
adaptive, since it resulted in a greater proportion of individuals adopting the 919 
beneficial variant. Such ‘weak conformity’ is apparently supported by the 920 
equivocal or conditional empirical evidence for conformity in humans (Coultas, 921 
2004; McElreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2007; Efferson et al., 2008; 922 
McElreath et al., 2008; Eriksson & Coultas, 2009; Morgan et al., 2012). Thus the 923 
impact of conformity, and, indeed, the extent to which species do conform, is 924 
currently unclear.  925 
 926 
(ii) Selective copying: Mathematical models have also suggested that selective 927 
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copying of successful behaviours or successful individuals, when coupled with 928 
the opportunity to learn asocially, can strongly affect cumulative cultural 929 
evolution (Ehn & Laland, 2012). Ehn and Laland propose an ‘individual refiner’ 930 
strategy, which first uses social learning, and then refines through individual 931 
learning, and continues to do so irrespective of the level achieved. This strategy 932 
generates high fitness across a broad range of conditions, leads to high amounts 933 
of socially transmitted behaviour in the population, and accumulates 934 
significantly more innovations over the generations than other strategies. 935 
 936 
Wisdom and Goldstone (2010) recently demonstrated this sensitivity to the 937 
performance of others in the laboratory by exposing human participants to a 938 
computerized game. When trying to solve the game, participants had access to 939 
the choices of the other participants and could choose to copy their task 940 
solutions. The investigators also manipulated whether participants could see the 941 
payoffs relating to the task solutions of the other participants. Overall the results 942 
indicated that when neighbour scores were visible, groups attained higher 943 
overall scores with more pronounced cumulative improvement across rounds 944 
than those in the invisible score condition. These results indicate that identifying 945 
and copying successful individuals may play an important role in human 946 
cumulative evolution.  947 
Likewise, Morgan et al. (2012) exposed humans to a series of cognitive 948 
puzzles, in which they were able to view the choices of others. In addition to 949 
conformist transmission, they found that participants were able to improve their 950 
performance using a proportional observation strategy, copying demonstrators 951 
in proportion to the level of reward the demonstrator received (Schlag, 1998). 952 
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The participants also used (conditional) proportional imitation strategies, 953 
whereby individuals copy the behaviour of others in proportion to how much 954 
better the other’s payoff is than their own (Schlag, 1998). Game theory analysis 955 
has established that this strategy optimises cumulative cultural learning (Schlag, 956 
1998). 957 
Empirical evidence of the presence of ‘copy successful behaviour’ and 958 
‘copy if dissatisfied’ strategies in nonhuman animals is currently limited to a 959 
handful of studies. Galef et al. (2008) reported evidence for a ‘proportional 960 
reviewing’ strategy, as set out by Schlag, (1998), in female Norway rats (Rattus 961 
norvegicus). Rats who were exposed to energetically dilute diets, displayed a 962 
greater propensity to copy the food choices of demonstrator rats than 963 
energetically satisfied rats, with the propensity to copy being proportional to the 964 
level of nutritional deprivation. However here the dissatisfaction was not with 965 
regard to the payoffs of a particular behavioural trait and the copying behaviour 966 
may also be interpreted as a manifestation of a ‘copy when uncertain’ strategy in 967 
nutritionally deprived rats (Kendal et al., 2009c). 968 
There is also some evidence that nine-spined sticklebacks (Pungitius 969 
pungitius), adopt a proportional observation strategy (Kendal et al., 2009a; Pike 970 
et al., 2010). After gaining personal experience of two food patches, containing 971 
different densities of food, focal fish observed conspecifics feeding at the same 972 
resource sites, however the food densities of the patches were manipulated, such 973 
that the fish’s personal experience no longer predicted the food density. When 974 
subsequently given the choice of food patch, focal fish tended to copy the social 975 
information in proportion to the demonstrators’ payoff (Kendal et al., 2009a; 976 
Pike et al., 2010). 977 
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Social learning strategies depend upon the underlying cognitive capacity 978 
for social learning and may also be influenced by social structure and tolerance. 979 
Given the evidence for social learning strategies in other animals, it seems 980 
unlikely that social learning strategies alone could explain the evolution of 981 
cumulative culture. However, it is possible that humans may implement 982 
particular strategies, such as payoff-based copying, more efficiently, by virtue of 983 
their possessing higher-fidelity transmission mechanisms. 984 
 985 
(c) Social structure  986 
In humans, differences in population size, connectedness and social structure are 987 
thought to alter the ease with which complex behaviour patterns can be 988 
transmitted between individuals, thus accounting for the observed distribution 989 
of cumulative culture (Powell et al., 2009; Kline & Boyd, 2010; Hill et al., 2011). 990 
In animals, social structure is normally measured by factors such as the 991 
dominance gradient (the ability of low-ranking individuals to win fights with 992 
higher-ranking individuals), amount of social play, the intensity of aggression 993 
within populations and the frequency of conciliatory displays (Thierry et al., 994 
2008). In species with a steep dominance gradient, social factors may hinder the 995 
invention and spread of cumulative modifications. A recent mathematical model 996 
of cultural progression found that increasing the number of tolerant 997 
knowledgeable individuals, is expected to generate higher levels of technological 998 
complexity, with tolerance thought to be essential in the initial stages of cultural 999 
progression (Pradhan et al., 2012). Thus, social structure may account for some 1000 
variation in the extent of cumulative culture (Burkart & van Schaik, 2010; Coussi-1001 
Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995).  1002 
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(i) Monopolisation: By monopolising resources and scrounging from low-rankers, 1003 
dominant individuals may exploit those lower in the social hierarchy and 1004 
prevent them from accessing novel resources (Lavallee, 1999; Soma & Hasegawa, 1005 
2004). In an experiment investigating tool use in free-ranging captive brown 1006 
capuchins (Cebus apella), Lavallee (1999) reported that the alpha male would 1007 
frequently chase low-ranking individuals away from the tree stump that 1008 
contained resources of honey. Out of a group of 11 individuals, four never had 1009 
the opportunity to interact with the task and others were also constrained in the 1010 
amount of time they could spend at the resource. Similar findings have been 1011 
reported in a study of social learning in wild lemurs (Lemur catta,  Kendal et al., 1012 
2010a). In a review of the primate literature, Reader and Laland (2001) found 1013 
that there were more reports of innovations in low-ranking individuals than 1014 
high- or mid-ranking individuals. If low-ranking individuals have a greater 1015 
propensity to innovate than high-ranking individuals but, because of the 1016 
activities of dominants, experience restricted opportunities to interact with 1017 
novel resources, or to perform any innovative behaviour they devise, then 1018 
innovation may be curtailed. This, coupled with the reported decreased 1019 
likelihood of individuals observing novel behaviour by low rankers compared to 1020 
high rankers (Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995; Kendal et al., In prep), means that 1021 
the population may not be able to exhibit cumulative social learning.  1022 
 1023 
(ii) Scrounging: Several studies have reported a relationship between the level of 1024 
scrounging, or kleptoparasitism, that individuals commit and the amount that 1025 
they learn socially (Giraldeau & Lefebvre, 1987; Beauchamp & Kacelnik, 1991; 1026 
Lefebvre & Helder, 1997; Midford et al., 2000; Caldwell & Whiten, 2003), 1027 
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although the direction of this relationship varies. Some studies have found that 1028 
social learning was inhibited by scrounging (Giraldeau & Lefebvre, 1987; 1029 
Lefebvre & Helder, 1997), leading to the hypothesis that, when able to scrounge, 1030 
individuals do not learn cues about the task from the demonstrator, but rather 1031 
learn that the demonstrator itself is a source of food (Giraldeau & Lefebvre, 1032 
1987; Beauchamp & Kacelnik, 1991). Scrounging, by inhibiting learning about 1033 
the task itself, might therefore restrict the spread of social information, thereby 1034 
hindering cumulative culture.  1035 
However, other researchers have found that scrounging enhanced the 1036 
learning of observers regarding a novel extractive foraging puzzle box (Midford 1037 
et al., 2000; Caldwell & Whiten, 2003). In these studies animals able to scrounge 1038 
performed better when given the opportunity to interact with the novel task, 1039 
than those that were not permitted to scrounge. The researchers argue that 1040 
scrounging promoted closer observation of the novel behaviour pattern and 1041 
attendance to cues of the puzzle box, rather than simply associating the 1042 
demonstrator with food, which allowed the scrounger to learn a behaviour 1043 
pattern more efficiently (Caldwell & Whiten, 2003).  1044 
Social learning may also depend upon species’ social tolerance levels 1045 
(Fragaszy & Visalberghi, 1989; Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995; Caldwell & 1046 
Whiten, 2003). Animals that display greater social tolerance of one another 1047 
(more egalitarian species) may exhibit enhanced social learning with scrounging, 1048 
since the co-action and close proximity allows the observers to learn from the 1049 
demonstrator more effectively. In contrast, scrounging may have an inhibitory 1050 
effect on social learning in despotic animals (displaying lower social tolerance) 1051 
due to a reduction in the opportunity for coaction and subsequent ability of 1052 
 43 
dominant individuals to access the resources (Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995). 1053 
An important contributing factor in the development of cumulative culture, thus, 1054 
may be a species’ level of social tolerance, with species displaying high social 1055 
tolerance, such as Homo sapiens, able to transfer more complex information. 1056 
However, since cumulative culture is not found in all egalitarian species, and a 1057 
lack of social tolerance was not found to contribute to a lack of cumulative 1058 
culture in chimpanzees or capuchins (Dean et al., 2012) factors other than social 1059 
tolerance must also contribute to its evolution.  1060 
 1061 
 (d) Demography 1062 
Demographic factors have also been proposed to influence cumulative 1063 
culture. Powell et al. (2009; 2010) have proposed that the changes in human 1064 
culture during the late Pleistocene, observed in the archaeological record, are 1065 
explained by demographic factors. Using simulation models building on a model 1066 
of Henrich’s (2004), Powell et al (2009; 2010) found that high population 1067 
densities and high migration rates between subpopulations resulted in 1068 
accumulation of modifications and increased complexity in technologies (see 1069 
also Kline & Boyd, 2010). They hypothesise that population dynamics may have 1070 
played an important part in the acceleration of cumulative cultural change 1071 
around 50 kya. However, a key assumption of the models is the pre-existence of 1072 
the cognitive capacities for social learning and cumulative culture in humans, 1073 
therefore, clearly demography alone is insufficient to generate cumulative 1074 
culture without these cognitive capabilities. Hill et al. (2011) highlight various 1075 
hunter gatherer group composition properties unique among the primates that 1076 
may have implications for the emergence of cumulative culture.  These include 1077 
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hunter gatherer bands being composed of a large proportion of non-kin 1078 
(suggesting cooperation between unrelated individuals), flexible patterns of 1079 
male and/or female dispersal, maintained lifelong social bonds (Chapais, 2011; 1080 
Rodseth et al., 1991) and bands forming constituent parts of larger social 1081 
networks. A likely by-product of these group structures is pronounced social 1082 
transmission and continued flow of cultural practices, knowledge and ideas 1083 
between bands and sub-populations, accentuating the probability that traits will 1084 
accumulate within and across populations. In contrast, for chimpanzees, 1085 
(affiliative) contact between communities is composed almost exclusively of 1086 
female migration, upon which contact with the natal group is lost (Chapais, 1087 
2011). Thus we see that human band compositions are especially well suited to 1088 
cultural transmission on a large scale. As such, a species’ demography may play 1089 
an important role in whether or not their culture has accumulated over 1090 
generations. 1091 
Enquist et al. (2010) investigated how the number of animals an 1092 
individual is able to copy affects the persistence of a cultural trait over time. They 1093 
used mathematical models to investigate under what conditions copying a single 1094 
cultural ‘parent’ could support a stable culture. They found that multiple cultural 1095 
parents were typically necessary for a stable culture as, unless perfect 1096 
transmission was possible, then copying of single cultural parents would result 1097 
in the proportion of individuals expressing a trait decreasing generation after 1098 
generation. This suggests that a population with overlapping generations and the 1099 
opportunity for learning from multiple individuals promotes cultural 1100 
transmission.  1101 
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Whilst a larger population size has a positive effect on the development 1102 
and sustainability of complex cumulative culture, small, isolated populations may 1103 
also lose cultural complexity. The best known example of cultural loss is the 1104 
island of Tasmania, where humans arrived about 34 kya and were isolated from 1105 
the mainland between 12 kya and 10 kya (Henrich, 2004). Subsequently, the 1106 
Tasmanians lost all but 24 items in their toolkit, compared to a toolkit of 1107 
hundreds on mainland Australia. Thus, when Europeans arrived in the 18th 1108 
century there was no bone technology, no skills for making winter clothing and 1109 
no ability to fish as seen in mainland Australian aborigine populations (Henrich, 1110 
2004). In modelling the data Henrich found that as population size dropped it 1111 
became much easier for losses of behavioural traits to occur due to small copying 1112 
errors. The isolation of Tasmania meant that the small population could rapidly 1113 
lose technologies, with little chance of innovations from within their population 1114 
or from migrant individuals.  1115 
The Tasmanian example is replicated with other populations in the Pacific 1116 
Ocean. Kline and Boyd (2010) found that in Pacific islands the population size 1117 
and rate of contact with other populations correlated with the complexity of the 1118 
marine foraging technology. Whilst acknowledging that complex technologies 1119 
may increase the carrying capacity of the population, the authors speculate that 1120 
the influx of migrant ideas and range of ideas from a larger population allow 1121 
modifications to cultural traits to be made more rapidly, ratcheting up 1122 
complexity. 1123 
In summary, the size, network structure and mobility of populations may 1124 
impact upon the number of cultural traits that a population can sustain. Clearly 1125 
demography alone cannot account for the initial development of individual 1126 
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cumulative cultural traits, otherwise it would be widespread in nature. However, 1127 
population size will influence the speed at which technologies ratchet up in 1128 
complexity, and the level of diversity maintained (Pradhan et al., 2012). 1129 
 1130 
(2) Efficiencies and complexities 1131 
Throughout this review, there has been discussion of empirical work and 1132 
field observations that focus on an increase in complexity over time. The ratchet 1133 
effect, as originally described by Tomasello (1994), specifically referred to 1134 
increases in complexity with social transmission. This increase in complexity is 1135 
hypothesised to have created the many artefacts, institutions and complex 1136 
technologies that humans display across populations (Tomasello, 1999). 1137 
However, we wish to emphasise that in cumulative culture, combined 1138 
with complexity, there must also be changes in efficiency. It is likely that cultural 1139 
traits that simply become more complex, with no improvements in efficiency, 1140 
would simply become too complex for individuals to learn or gain sufficient 1141 
benefit to justify learning them. For example, Mesoudi (2011b) has posited a 1142 
limit to cumulative complexity due to the costs of acquiring a complex trait from 1143 
the previous generation within a life-time.  An obvious example of the proposed 1144 
requirement for improved efficiency alongside complexity is that of computing 1145 
technology; computers, have become more compact, and user friendly, as they 1146 
have become more powerful.  1147 
Some studies featured in this review have solely focussed on cumulative 1148 
improvements in efficiency (Flynn, 2008; Kirby et al., 2008). Flynn (2008) finds 1149 
that the imitation of causally irrelevant actions, (or ‘over-imitation’), as seen in 1150 
other experiments with humans (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 1151 
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2010; Wood et al., 2012) reduces over laboratory generations with children 1152 
employing rational rather than blind/faithful imitation, making the technique 1153 
used to solve the task more efficient. Similarly, the decrease in diversity, and thus 1154 
increase in efficiency, of Kirby et al.’s (2008) artificial languages, relies on 1155 
mistakes made by individuals. Indeed, the structured manner in which 1156 
individuals made language learning ‘mistakes’ resulted in the structure that 1157 
emerged in the language, in turn enabling efficient language learning.  1158 
To take an alternative example, New Caledonian Crows are observed to 1159 
make a variety of different hooked tools (Hunt & Grey, 2003). However, Sanz et 1160 
al (2009) assert that these hooks do not enhance the efficiency with which the 1161 
crows can gain food, they are simply additions to the tool which increase its 1162 
physical complexity.  We see this as an empirical issue: if evidence can be 1163 
provided that step tools are more efficient than other tools then (provided these 1164 
tools also meet the other criteria outlined in Table 1) they may yet prove to be a 1165 
case of cumulative culture. Likewise, we may posit a similar argument for the 1166 
stone-handling of Japanese macaques which may increase in complexity yet, as 1167 
there is no apparent ‘purpose’ to the behaviour, does not increase efficiency. 1168 
Finally, there are examples in human culture in which ceremonial or decorative 1169 
items become more complex to manufacture, independent of their original 1170 
function (functioning instead, for example, as signs of wealth, position, skill or 1171 
power) and thus without increases in the efficiency with which a target is 1172 
achieved (Basalla, 1988). For example, the Torres Strait culture created ornate 1173 
decorative (turtle shell) fish hook ornaments that were worn by married women 1174 
(Hedley, 1907, cited by Florek, 2005), creating complex, carved, symbolic 1175 
cultural artefacts that did not increase the efficiency of the items’ original fishing 1176 
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function (although the efficiency with which it acted as a display could be 1177 
investigated). 1178 
We emphasise that whilst cumulative culture primarily drives the 1179 
complexity of cultural traits, the efficiency with which the trait is transmitted, 1180 
executed, and enables achievement of its intended purpose, may also change.  1181 
Thus the interplay between the complexity and efficiency of cumulative cultural 1182 
traits potentially influences how traits evolve with some showing increasing 1183 
efficiency and reducing complexity (e.g. language change in the laboratory), 1184 
some increasing complexity and increasing efficiency (e.g. computing 1185 
technology) and others increasing in complexity and reducing in efficiency (e.g. 1186 
symbolic culture). We believe that this is a neglected aspect of research into 1187 
cumulative culture, which warrants further investigation.                                1188 
 1189 
 1190 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 1191 
(i) Historical evidence suggests that human culture is cumulative, with 1192 
successive generations building on what went before. This evidence is 1193 
supported by empirical data, which suggests that humans are able to 1194 
observe other individuals and modify what they have seen. 1195 
(ii) Although some researchers have argued that certain non-human 1196 
species ratchet up the complexity of cultural traits, the evidence that 1197 
non-humans have cumulative culture is weak. Presently there is no 1198 
evidence that any species, except humans, have cumulative culture. 1199 
Some evidence from the wild suggests that modifications have been 1200 
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made to the behavioural traits of some animals, but evidence that 1201 
these were socially transmitted is lacking.  1202 
(iii) There have been a number of different hypotheses advanced for the 1203 
evolution of cumulative culture. Current evidence supports the view 1204 
that a package of sociocognitive capabilities (including teaching, 1205 
imitation, verbal instruction and prosocial tendencies) present in 1206 
humans, but not other animals, underpins cumulative cultural 1207 
learning, probably because it promotes high-fidelity information 1208 
transmission. 1209 
(iv) Currently, studies of cumulative culture often focus solely on increases 1210 
in trait complexity. However, evidence from historical reports and 1211 
experimental investigation suggest that there are also associated 1212 
changes in trait efficiency, which warrant investigation. 1213 
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